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67 
THOUGHTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY B. DYK* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article is adapted from my September 22, 2016 address to the 
Supreme Court IP Review at the Chicago-Kent College of Law. The views 
expressed are, of course, my own. And you will forgive me for not 
predicting our circuit decisions for the coming year; circuit judges are more 
comfortable discussing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence than their own. 
These are some thoughts on the relationship between the Supreme 
Court and our court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, in no particular order. 
I 
The Supreme Court takes a lot of our cases.1 About a decade ago I 
wrote a forward to the American University Law Review annual issue on 
the Federal Circuit.2 I predicted that the Supreme Court would continue to 
take our cases, and that many of those cases would involve substantive 
patent law.3 That proved to be prescient, but it was easy to predict. 
In the past ten years, the Supreme Court has taken an average of four 
of our cases each term, representing 5.4% of the Court’s merits cases.4 A 
large proportion of those cases have involved substantive patent law or 
related procedural issues.5 
 
*Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. I thank my law clerk, Giovanni 
S. Saarman González, for his excellent research assistance. 
1. See infra Table 1. 
 2. Hon. Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 763 (2008). 
 3. See id. at 763–64 (“Like it or not, however, the Supreme Court’s role in th[e intellectual 
property] area will continue, and the bar must heed the Greek proverb—to accept that which we cannot 
change.”). 
 4. See infra Table 1. From OT 2006 to OT 2015 the Supreme Court averaged 4 merits cases from 
the Federal Circuit. 
 5. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse 
Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015); 
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,  
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014); 
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health 
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In this respect, over the past ten October Terms (“OT”), our court has 
represented the median among the circuits.6 In absolute terms, the Supreme 
Court has taken comparatively more cases from the Second, Fifth, Sixth, 
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, and comparatively fewer from the First, Third, 
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and, surprisingly, District of Columbia Circuits. At 
the extremes, the Ninth Circuit overwhelmingly dominated, accounting for 
22% of the Court’s merits cases, while the First Circuit made up just 2.8%. 
However, if one considers the total number of cases decided by each 
circuit, comparatively more of our cases were taken by the Supreme Court 
than any other circuit, with the D.C. Circuit as a close second.7 The 
Supreme Court reviewed 0.28% of total appeals terminated in our court and 
0.26% for the D.C. Circuit. The third most reviewed circuit was the First 
Circuit, but its rate was only half that of the D.C. Circuit at 0.13%. In other 
words, the Supreme Court was significantly more likely to review cases 
from our court and the D.C. Circuit than from any of the other circuits. 
 
 
Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014); Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1749 (2014); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 
S. Ct. 1761 (2013); Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo 
Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289 (2012); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011); Board of Tr. of the Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011); Global-Tech Appliances, 
Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. 
LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Microsoft 
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 6. See infra Table 1. 
 7. See infra Table 1. There is wide variation in the total number of cases decided by each circuit 
(total appeals terminated) over this period, from just under 12,000 in the D.C. Circuit to nearly 129,000 
in the Ninth Circuit. Accounting for this variation provides a more helpful measure of the likelihood of 
Supreme Court review on a per case basis. 
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Court 
Total 
Cases 
Percent 
of All 
Merits 
Cases 
Average 
Cases 
per OT 
Total 
Appeals 
Terminated 
Percent of 
Total 
Appeals 
Terminated 
First 21 2.84% 2.1 16,522 0.127% 
Second 55 7.43% 5.5 62,269 0.088% 
Third 33 4.46% 3.3 39,464 0.084% 
Fourth 40 5.41% 4 50,306 0.080% 
Fifth 59 7.97% 5.9 79,444 0.074% 
Sixth 55 7.43% 5.5 49,641 0.111% 
Seventh 39 5.27% 3.9 32,149 0.121% 
Eighth 34 4.59% 3.4 30,926 0.110% 
Ninth 160 21.62% 16 128,635 0.124% 
Tenth 28 3.78% 2.8 23,500 0.119% 
Eleventh 48 6.49% 4.8 66,653 0.072% 
D.C. 31 4.19% 3.1 11,798 0.263% 
Federal 40 5.41% 4 14,343 0.279% 
All Circuits 641 86.62% 64.1 604,909 0.106% 
All Merits Cases 740 100.00% 74 
  
Circuit Median 40 5.41% 4 
  
 
TABLE 1: OT 2006–2015: Supreme Court Review Rate by Circuit8 
 
 8. The Total Cases column is generated from the annual statistics on the Supreme Court 
published by the Harvard Law Review. This column sums the number of “Full Opinions” for OT 2006 
through OT 2015, which include the Court’s merits opinions and those per curiam opinions “containing 
sufficient legal reasoning to be counted as full opinions.” See The Statistics, 130 HARV. L. REV. 507, 
516 tbl. 2(E) (2016); The Statistics, 129 HARV. L. REV. 381, 391 tbl. 2(E) (2015); The Statistics, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 401, 411 tbl. 2(E) (2014); The Statistics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 408, 418 tbl. 2(E) (2013); 
The Statistics, 126 HARV. L. REV. 338, 397 tbl. 2(E) (2012); The Statistics, 125 HARV. L. REV. 362, 371 
tbl. 2(E) (2011); The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 420 tbl. 2(E) (2010); The Statistics, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 382, 391 tbl. 2(E) (2009); The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 525 tbl. 2(E) (2008); The 
Statistics, 121 HARV. L. REV. 436, 445 tbl. 2(E) (2007).  
  The Total Appeals Terminated column sums the number of appeals terminated in a given 
Circuit for Fiscal Year 2006 through Fiscal Year 2015 (which represents the time period from October 
1, 2005 to September 30, 2015). This is offset—beginning and ending one year earlier—from the period 
of Supreme Court review (OT 2006 through OT 2015). This approach is consistent with the 
methodology used by others in the literature and “approximates the lag between the date that a case is 
decided by a court of appeals and the date that the case is reviewed and disposed of by the Supreme 
Court.” Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeal, 2 
LANDSLIDE 8, 11 n.6 (2010). With the exception of the Federal Circuit, these data are drawn from 
statistics published by USCourts.gov. See Federal Court Management Statistics—Profiles, USCOURTS 
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/19793; Federal Court Management Statistics—Profiles, 
USCOURTS (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/13930. Data for the Federal Circuit is from 
the court’s website. See Table B-8. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, 
Terminated, and Pending, CAFC.USCOURTS (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/appeals_filed_terminated_and_pending.pdf; Table B-8. U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
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For the coming term, the Supreme Court has already granted certiorari 
in four of our patent cases and in one trademark case: 1. SCA Hygiene 
Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products9 (which raises the 
question “[w]hether and to what extent the defense of laches may bar a 
claim for patent infringement . . ., 35 U.S.C. § 286”10); 2. Samsung 
Electronics v. Apple11 (where the Court recently decided that for multi-
component  products,  the  relevant  “article  of  manufacture” under 35 
U.S.C. § 289 covered by a design patent can “encompass[] both a product 
sold to a consumer and a component of that product”12); 3. Life 
Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp.13 (which raises the question 
“[w]hether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that supplying a single, 
commodity component of a multi-component invention from the United 
States is an infringing act under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), exposing the 
 
Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, CAFC.USCOURTS (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/appeals_filed_terminated_pending_2014.pdf; Table B-8. U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, CAFC.USCOURTS (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/FY13/appeals%20filed%20term%20pend%209.30.13.pdf; Table B-8. U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, CAFC.USCOURTS (Sept. 
30, 2012), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/Appeals_Filed_Terminated_and_Pending_2012_REV.pdf; Table B-8. U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, CAFC.USCOURTS (Sept. 
30, 2011), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/Appeals_Filed_Term_Pend_2011.pdf; Table B-8. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit—Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, CAFC.USCOURTS (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/Appeals_Filed_Terminated_and_Pending_2010.pdf; Table B-8. U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, CAFC.USCourts (Sept. 30, 2009), 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/b08sep09.pdf; Table B-8. U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, CAFC.USCOURTS (Sept. 
30, 2008), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/b08sep08.pdf; Table B-8. 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, 
CAFC.USCOURTS (Sept. 30, 2007), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/b08sep07.pdf; Table B-8. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, 
Terminated, and Pending, CAFC.USCOURTS (Sept. 30, 2006), 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/ao0906.pdf. 
 9. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., 807 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 
136 S. Ct. 1824 (2016) (granting certiorari). 
 10. SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sca-hygiene-products-aktiebolag-v-first-quality-baby-
products-llc/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
 11. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 136 S. Ct. 1453 (2016) 
(granting certiorari). 
 12. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 15–777, slip. op. at 6 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2016). 
 13. Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014), 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016) 
(granting certiorari). 
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manufacturer to liability for all worldwide sales”14); 4. Impression Products 
v. Lexmark International15 (which raises questions regarding the domestic 
and international exhaustion of patent rights)16; and 5. Lee v. Tam17 (which 
raises the question “[w]hether the disparagement provision of the Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), . . . is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause 
of the First Amendment”18). There are also other patent cases that are 
candidates for a grant during the term. In one of our cases where a petition 
was filed, the Court has requested the views of the Solicitor General.19 
I continue to believe that Supreme Court review of our patent cases 
has been critical to the development of patent law and likewise beneficial 
to our court. “The Supreme Court necessarily plays a critical role in 
reinterpreting, or even overruling, earlier Supreme Court decisions and in 
altering our jurisprudence to keep up with the demands of a changing 
world.”20 
II 
Considering the number of cases—and substantive patent cases in 
particular—that the Court has taken, one might ask how our court has fared 
in Supreme Court review. Are we, in other words, a “rogue” court of 
appeals as some have suggested?21 In general, the reversal rate for our court 
is comparable to the other circuits. Although one study of OT 1999 to OT 
2008 calculated the median reversal rate for the circuits at around 68% and 
our court’s reversal rate at 83%, this rate has declined in recent years.22 
Over the last ten terms, our reversal rate has averaged around 70%, just 
 
 14. Life Technologies Corporation v. Promega Corporation, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/life-technologies-corporation-v-promega-corporation/ (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
 15. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc), No. 
15-1189 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2016) (granting certiorari). 
 16. Impression Products v. Lexmark International, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/impression-products-inc-v-lexmark-international-inc/ (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
 17. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 2016 WL 1587871 (Sep. 29, 
2016) (granting certiorari). 
 18. Lee v. Tam, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/lee-v-tam/ (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
 19. See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/amgen-inc-v-sandoz-inc/. 
 20. Dyk, supra note 2, at 768. 
 21. E.g., Timothy B. Lee, How a Rogue Appeals Court Wrecked the Patent System, ARSTECHNICA 
(Sept. 30, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/how-a-rogue-appeals-court-wrecked-the-
patent-system/. 
 22. Compare Hofer, supra note 8, with Roy E. Hofer & Joshua H. James, Supreme Court Reversal 
Rates for Federal Circuit Cases, 6 LANDSLIDE 40, 40–41 (2014), and infra Table 2. 
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slightly above the circuit median of 66.7%.23 At the outer bounds are the 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits, with reversal rates of 83.6% and 81.3% 
respectively, and the First Circuit, with a reversal rate of 47.6%. 
 
Court Total Cases Reversed Vacated Affirmed 
R & V 
Rate 
First 21 9 1 11 47.62% 
Second 55 30 5 20 63.64% 
Third 33 16 6 11 66.67% 
Fourth 40 14 10 16 60.00% 
Fifth 59 31 12 16 72.88% 
Sixth 55 38 8 9 83.64% 
Seventh 39 14 10 15 61.54% 
Eighth 34 22 5 7 79.41% 
Ninth 160 106 24 30 81.25% 
Tenth 28 11 6 11 60.71% 
Eleventh 48 25 10 13 72.92% 
D.C. 31 14 6 11 64.52% 
Federal 40 21 7 12 70.00% 
All Circuits 641 350 110 181 71.76% 
All Merits Cases 740 414 123 203 72.57% 
Circuit Median 40 
   
66.67% 
 
TABLE 2: OT 2006–2015: Reversal Rate on Merits Cases by Circuit24 
III 
The Supreme Court’s decisions have had a major impact on patent 
law. Some—Zurko25 and Teva26 come to mind—may not have had a 
significant impact. But most of the Court’s cases have involved important 
and foundational questions with enormous impacts on patent litigation. For 
instance, the Court’s decisions in Alice,27 Mayo,28 Bilski,29 and Myriad30 
 
 23. See infra Table 2. 
 24. See supra note 8 regarding how the Total Cases column was determined. The data for the 
Reversed, Vacated, and Affirmed columns were likewise drawn from the annual statistics published by 
the Harvard Law Review.  
 25. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
 26. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
 27. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 28. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 29. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 30. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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have reshaped the legal landscape for determining subject matter eligibility 
under § 101.31 
With respect to patent validity, the Court’s decisions in KSR32 and 
Nautilus33 have similarly reshaped the legal standards for determining 
obviousness under § 10334 and indefiniteness under § 112.35 
On the issue of infringement, the Court’s opinions in Global-Tech,36 
Limelight,37 Commil,38 and Microsoft v. AT&T,39 have impacted the liability 
of accused infringers. Global Tech set forth the legal standard for induced 
infringement, requiring knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent 
infringement.40 Then, Limelight and Commil clarified that underlying direct 
infringement is a prerequisite to induced infringement liability41 and that a 
good-faith belief of patent invalidity is not a defense.42 And, relatedly, in 
Microsoft v. AT&T the Court circumscribed liability for extraterritorial 
infringement under § 271(f).43 
Again with respect to infringer liability, the Court’s decisions in 
Warner-Jenkinson44 and Festo45 on prosecution history estoppel and the 
doctrine of equivalents have also had far reaching implications. 
Another group of recent cases has reshaped the remedies available to 
patent owners and accused infringers. In Medimmune46 and Medtronic47 the 
Court expanded the availability of declaratory judgment actions for accused 
infringers. The Court’s decision in Caraco48 defined the counterclaim 
provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, expanding declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction for generic manufacturers. The Court’s opinion in eBay49 
dramatically changed the standards for permanent injunctions. The Court 
 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 32. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 33. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). 
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 36. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011). 
 37. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 38. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). 
 39. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
 40. Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 766. 
 41. Limelight,134 S. Ct. at 2117–18. 
 42. Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1928. 
 43. Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 449–54; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012). 
 44. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).  
 45. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Koygo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 46. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 47. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014). 
 48. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012). 
 49. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
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set forth the legal standard for awarding enhanced damages under 35 
U.S.C. § 284 in the recent Halo opinion,50 clarifying that objective 
unreasonableness is not a legal prerequisite. Similarly, Octane Fitness51 
and Highmark52 established the legal standard for determining “exceptional 
cases” under the fee shifting provision of the Patent Act,53 and the 
appropriate standard for our court to review a district court’s fee shifting 
determination on appeal.54 
Finally, two other recent decisions, Kappos55 and Cuozzo,56 have also 
clarified the procedures for relief from decisions by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office). Kappos of course considered 
the ability to introduce new evidence in 35 U.S.C. § 145 proceedings,57 and 
Cuozzo construed the provision of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
that bars appellate review of the Patent Office’s decision to institute inter 
partes review proceedings.58 
IV 
Apart from the substantive impact of Supreme Court decisions, when 
the Supreme Court reviews our cases, the very fact of its review directs 
attention to the issue addressed by the Court and alters the course of 
litigation, affecting both the issues raised in the districts courts and the 
Patent Office and those subsequently argued on appeal. Two recent 
examples illustrate this phenomenon. Before the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Bilski,59 Mayo,60 Myriad,61 and Alice,62 challenges to patentability based 
on 35 U.S.C. § 101 were rare. Those challenges now consume a significant 
portion of our docket. For instance, Table 3 compares the five year periods 
before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski; the number of 
§ 101 cases on our docket has increased nearly 60%. This is especially true 
for non-precedential opinions. (There was a 23% increase for precedential 
opinions and a 533% increase for non-precedential opinions.) The increase 
 
 50. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 51. Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
 52. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
 53. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756; see also 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). 
 54. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1749. 
 55. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012). 
 56. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
 57. Kappos, 132 S. Ct. at 1700–01; see also 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2012). 
 58. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2139–42; see also 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012). 
 59. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 60. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 61. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 62. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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is even more pronounced in the district courts where the number of cases 
raising § 101 issues has increased over 170%. A similar trend is currently 
underway with respect to attorney’s fees after the Court’s recent decisions 
in Octane Fitness63 and Highmark.64 
 
Federal Circuit 
 
Precedential Non-Precedential All Cases 
 
Total 
Average  
per Year 
Total 
Average  
per Year 
Total 
Average  
per Year 
Pre-Bilski 39 7.8 3 0.6 42 8.4 
Post-Bilski 48 9.6 19 3.8 67 13.4 
Change 9 23.1% 16 533.3% 25 59.5% 
District Courts 
 
Precedential Non-Precedential All Cases 
 
Total 
Average  
per Year 
Total 
Average  
per Year 
Total 
Average  
per Year 
Pre-Bilski 82 16.4 121 24.2 203 40.6 
Post-Bilski 171 34.2 382 76.4 553 110.6 
Change 89 108.5% 261 215.7% 350 172.4% 
 
TABLE 3: Decisions Citing § 101 in the Federal Circuit and District 
Courts65 
V 
Very few of the Federal Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court 
involve circuit splits. By my estimation, only one over the last decade.66 
And a study from 2013 found a total of only eight in the history of our 
court.67 This is understandable since our jurisdiction is exclusive, with 
some exceptions, such as federal tax cases and some whistleblower cases. It 
has been suggested by some that the system would benefit by creating 
 
 63. Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
 64. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
 65. These statistics were generated by simple Westlaw searches for opinions citing to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 during the five-year periods before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski—June 1, 
2005 to June 1, 2010 and June 1, 2010 to June 1, 2015. 
 66. See Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571 (2008). But see Mark S. Davies, Seeking 
Supreme Court Review In Patent Cases, LAW360 (Apr. 21, 2008) (stating that “KSR and Medimmune 
alleged a circuit split by pointing to cases decided before the Federal Circuit was established”). 
 67. Ryan Stephenson, Note, Federal Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme Court: An Empirical 
Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 275 (2013). 
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circuit splits in patent cases.68 This strikes me as a highly undesirable 
proposal. It would deprive the patent community of the very benefit that 
creation of the Federal Circuit was designed to confer—greater uniformity 
and certainty in patent law. In my view we should be working in the 
opposite direction—acting to foster greater certainty to avoid the excessive 
amount of patent litigation that now exists. Interestingly, in Holmes v. 
Vornado69 the Supreme Court, and Justice Steven’s concurring opinion in 
particular, suggested that channeling some patent cases to other circuits 
might be desirable, and allowed patent claims raised as counterclaims to go 
to the regional circuits.70 Congress apparently disagreed, overruling that 
decision in short order.71 
What is interesting, though, is that a significant proportion of the 
Supreme Court’s cases from our court involve reconciling our 
jurisprudence with jurisprudence in other areas. In other words, the 
Supreme Court thinks that part of its task is to bring to bear its generalist 
perspective on our specialty areas. 
A few examples include eBay,72 Commil,73 Medtronic,74 
Medimmune,75 Zurko,76 Octane Fitness,77 Teva,78 and Highmark.79 For 
instance, in eBay the Court sought to make sure that the standard for 
injunctive relief in the patent area is the same as for other federal causes of 
action.80 In Commil the Court brought its understanding of civil and 
criminal liability to bear on the issue of induced infringement where an 
actor lacks actual knowledge that the conduct violates the law.81 And in 
Medtronic and Medimmune the Court clarified the constitutional and 
procedural dimensions to the Declaratory Judgment Act in the context of 
 
 68. John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 518 (2010); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 
101 NW. L. REV. 1619 (2007); Hon. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal 
Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013). 
 69. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
 70. See id. at 838–39. 
 71. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 19, 125 Stat. 284, 331–32 (2011) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1) and 1338(a)). 
 72. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 73. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). 
 74. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014). 
 75. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 76. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
 77. Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
 78. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
 79. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
 80. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006). 
 81. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920,1928–30 (2015). 
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patent litigation.82 In a number of other cases, such as Zurko, Octane 
Fitness, Teva, and Highmark, the Court’s generalist perspective, especially 
on issues of procedure and standards of appellate review of decisions, has 
pervaded its opinions. 
VI 
As this perhaps suggests, our court is viewed by the Supreme Court, 
and indeed, by the other circuits as inhabiting a world apart. This is due in 
large part to the fact that we have no criminal jurisdiction, hear few 
constitutional issues, and almost no cases involve state-law issues. Some of 
our non-patent jurisdiction involves issues similar to cases in other 
circuits—contract law, takings, administrative law—but increasingly our 
jurisdiction is composed of patent cases. 
When I joined the Federal Circuit sixteen years ago, around 33% of 
our docket consisted of patent cases;83 for fiscal year 2016 it was 63%.84 It 
is interesting to note that when the Federal Circuit was first created, 
estimates were that patent cases would make up only 12% of the court’s 
total caseload.85 That estimate proved to be quite inaccurate. 
Our patent cases mainly come from three sources: the district courts, 
the Patent Office, and the International Trade Commission, but a few also 
come from the Court of Federal Claims. The proportion of patent cases 
coming from the district courts has not increased during my time on the 
court. Rather, the most substantial growth is in cases coming from the 
Patent Office.86 In 2000, cases from the Patent Office made up only 4% of 
our docket while in 2016 they were 33%.87 Indeed, as some predicted,88 
appeals from the Patent Office have overtaken those from the district 
courts.89 
 
 82. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 849–52 (2014); 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126–37 (2007). 
 83. Appeals Filed, by Category—FY 2000 (on file with author). 
 84. Appeals Filed, by Category—FY 2016, CAFC.USCOURTS (2016), 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/FY16_Caseload_by_Category.pdf. 
 85. See Hon. Pauline Newman, Foreword: The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
821, 824 (2005). 
 86. See Appeals Filed, by Category—FY 2000, supra note 83; Appeals Filed, by Category—FY 
2016, supra note 84. 
 87. See Appeals Filed, by Category—FY 2000, supra note 83; Appeals Filed, by Category—FY 
2016, supra note 84. 
 88. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Federal Circuit Now Receiving More Appeals Arising from the PTO 
than the District Courts, PATENTLYO (Mar. 2, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/03/receiving-
appeals-district.html 
 89. Appeals Filed, by Category—FY 2016, supra note 84. 
  
78 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 16:67 
And these percentages understate the percentage of actual workload 
for patent cases, which is probably on the order of 80%. This growing trend 
to patent dominance has increased our isolation, and the sense of our 
uniqueness, which I think is highly undesirable. Perhaps the best antidote 
involves a legislative solution—Congress could reconfigure our court’s 
jurisdiction by adding other non-patent jurisdiction, though one recent 
effort to give us jurisdiction over all immigration cases proved to be ill-
considered and was abandoned.90 
VII 
Another feature of our relationship with the Supreme Court lies in the 
lack of communication between the two courts. In the past several years we 
have done a good job I think in opening lines of communication with the 
district courts that hear patent cases at the trial level, inviting district court 
judges to sit with us, sitting as trial judges by designation in district courts, 
and participating in conferences with district court judges. 
No comparable lines of communication exist with respect to the 
Supreme Court or its justices. And this is somewhat unlike the situation 
that exists with respect to other circuits. As to some of them, justices were 
members of those circuits and keep up with their former colleagues. And 
the Supreme Court repeatedly takes clerks from most if not all of the other 
circuits. The Supreme Court, of course, has no justices from our court and 
has had only one law clerk from our court. So too, unlike other circuits, our 
judicial conference is held in a single day in Washington, D.C. to make 
possible broad attendance by the bar, particularly by government lawyers. 
This format does not encourage informal communication with the justices. 
So our communication with the Supreme Court is largely limited to 
our respective opinions which, of course, is how courts communicate about 
the legal issues that come before them. We have sometimes had difficulty 
interpreting the Supreme Court decisions in the patent area, hampering our 
understanding of what the Court wants us to do. Ironically, while the 
Supreme Court does take many of our cases, it does not take that many, 
limiting the opportunities for the Supreme Court to communicate its views 
to our court. 
Our communication as well has somewhat been lacking in clarity. 
While some of the Supreme Court patent cases result from en banc 
 
 90. See, e.g., Securing America’s Borders Act, S. 2454, 109th Cong. § 501 (2006); Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1497 (2012); Marius Meland, 
Immigration Critics Would Swamp Federal Circuit, Critics Say, LAW360 (Mar. 21, 2006), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/5784/immigration-bill-would-swamp-federal-circuit-critics-say. 
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decisions where contrasting views and relevant policy considerations have 
typically been vetted at length, many other cases come from panel 
decisions, some of which have been non-precedential. For instance, over 
the last ten terms, the vast majority—74%—of our patent cases reviewed 
by the Supreme Court were precedential panel decisions,91 only 17% were 
en banc decisions92 where the majority and dissent often speak directly to 
the Supreme Court, and nearly 9% were non-precedential decisions93 in 
which the legal principle was established years earlier. 
Panel decisions, such as Commil, Teva, Highmark, Medtronic, and 
Ebay, and especially non-precedential ones, such as KSR, are unlikely to 
explore or discuss the underlying reasons for the legal principle being 
articulated. And while our bar includes many sophisticated Supreme Court 
advocates and in general has done a good job in Supreme Court cases, 
commentators have suggested that neither the Solicitor General’s office nor 
the private bar has always done a good job of helping the Supreme Court 
understand the realities of the patent world—bridging the gulf between the 
Supreme Court and our court.94 Compounding this is the complex 
 
 91. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2131 
(2016); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vac’d, 136 S. Ct. 1923 
(2016); Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vac’d, 135 S. Ct. 1920 
(2015); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vac’d, 135 S. Ct. 831 
(2015); Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vac’d, 134 S. Ct. 2120 
(2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vac’d, 134 
S. Ct. 1744 (2014); Medtronic, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 695 F.3d 166 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. 
Ct. 843 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012), aff’d-in-part and rev’d-in-part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013); Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 
601 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012); Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); i4i Ltd. P’ship v. 
Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 564 U.S. 91 (2011); Board of Tr. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 
563 U.S. 776 (2011); SEB S.A. v. Motgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 
563 U.S. 754 (2011); LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d, 
553 U.S. 617 (2008); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 
550 U.S. 437 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 
549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 92. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d 134 S. Ct. 
2347 (2014); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d 
134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014); Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012); 
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 93. See Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 Fed. Appx. 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
rev’d 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
rev’d 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 94. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, The Supreme Court Doesn’t Understand Software, and That’s a 
Problem, VOX (June 20, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/6/20/5824426/the-supreme-court-doesnt-
understand-software-and-thats-a-problem; Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap—Analogies to the Rescue, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/argument-recap-analogies-to-the-
rescue/; Mark Joseph Stern, Scalia on DNA Patents: I Don’t Really Understand Science, SLATE (June 
13, 2013), 
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technology involved in many cases that presents what can be called a 
technological barrier to understanding our jurisprudence. 
Recently, in one case some of us spoke directly to the Supreme Court 
about the need to consider clarification to Supreme Court jurisprudence in 
certain § 101 cases.95 
VIII 
There is a perceived tension between the Supreme Court and our court 
by the bar and by the academy. We and the Supreme Court appear to be 
united in agreeing that patent law is important, but there is often a 
perception that the Supreme Court on the one hand, views us as having a 
parochial attitude or a we know best attitude toward patent law, as being 
deeply divided, and as being overly patent-friendly. On the other hand, our 
bar and the academy have expressed skepticism that the Supreme Court 
understands patent law well enough to make the governing rules—an 
attitude not likely to be endearing to the Supreme Court. As two 
commentators have uncharitably asked: “Is the Supreme Court too 
unsophisticated in patent law to appreciate the wise insights of expert 
Federal Circuit judges, or are those Federal Circuit judges too narrowly 
focused on patent law to appreciate the broader rules of jurisprudence, 
procedure, and statutory interpretation?”96 
These attitudinal differences are not often overtly articulated by 
justices and judges, though comments made by justices during oral 
argument have sometimes painted us as parochial. But one difference is 
clearly evident. Our court, in keeping with the legislative history of our 
statute, views our task as in part articulating clear rules; the Supreme Court 
on the other hand views clear rules as often suspect. 
For example, in Octane Fitness the Court characterized the standard 
from our Brooks Furniture opinion for determining “exceptional cases” 
under the fee shifting provision of the Patent Act—35 U.S.C. § 285 
(2012)—as “superimpos[ing] an inflexible framework onto statutory text 
that is inherently flexible.”97 Instead, the Court articulated a flexible, 
 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/06/13/myriad_dna_patenting_supreme_court_case_scali
a_says_he_doesn_t_get_the_science.html. 
 95. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, 
809 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016). 
 96. Jeff Bleich & Josh Patashnik, The Federal Circuit Under Fire, S.F. ATT’Y, Fall 2014, at 40, 
41–42. 
 97. Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014). 
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totality of the circumstances approach for district courts to exercise their 
discretion.98 
Similarly, the Court in Halo rejected our court’s two-part In re 
Seagate test for awarding enhanced damages under the Patent Act, which 
required findings of both objective and subjective recklessness, as “unduly 
rigid” and “impermissibly encumber[ing] the statutory grant of discretion 
to district courts.”99 Again, the Court placed greater discretion with district 
courts to consider the particular circumstances of each case in deciding 
whether to award enhanced damages.100 
In Festo, our court adopted a complete bar against any claim of 
equivalence where prosecution history estoppel applied.101 The Supreme 
Court rejected this “rigid” framework and again adopted a more flexible 
approach with a rebuttable presumption for prosecution history estoppel.102 
And in KSR, the Court rejected our court’s “teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation” test for obviousness.103 Instead, the Court noted that this test 
provides a “helpful insight” but that it should “not become [a] rigid 
mandatory formula.”104 
It would be interesting to consider whether the Supreme Court’s 
aversion to bright-line rules in the patent area exists as well in other areas 
of statutory construction. 
IX 
Given the significant number of our cases that have gone to the 
Supreme Court, it should not be surprising that a significant part of our task 
lies in interpreting recent Supreme Court decisions. And indeed, the 
Supreme Court has often explicitly left that task to us. For instance, in 
Warner-Jenkinson the Court concluded its opinion with: “We expect that 
the Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in 
the orderly course of case-by-case determinations, and we leave such 
refinement to that court’s sound judgment in this area of its special 
expertise.”105 And recently, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Halo 
clarified that “in applying [the abuse of discretion] standard [for enhanced 
 
 98. See id. at 1756–57. 
 99. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016). 
 100. See id. at 1932–34. 
 101. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002). 
 102. Id. at 738–41. 
 103. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 422 (2007). 
 104. Id. at 419. 
 105. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). 
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damages], the Federal Circuit may take advantage of its own experience 
and expertise in patent law.”106 
But we are not merely charged with interpreting recent cases. Some of 
the most significant patent jurisprudence is not the product of a detailed 
statute but of Supreme Court decisions that have created extra-statutory 
requirements for patentability. Thus in the area of § 101—subject matter 
eligibility—the Supreme Court has recognized that the exceptions for laws 
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are judicially created.107 
So too with respect to obviousness the doctrine was created by the Supreme 
Court long before its incorporation into the statute in 1952.108 Thus, older 
Supreme Court cases remain highly relevant in interpreting the doctrines. 
X 
Like other circuits, we must accommodate ourselves to the inevitable 
delay in the Supreme Court review process, which may take years to 
resolve important legal issues. Of course delay is both understandable and 
inherent in Supreme Court review. For instance, parties have 90 days to file 
for certiorari,109 the Court’s term lasts only from October through June, and 
it can take only a limited number of merits cases each year. But some 
delays are unique for patent litigation. In many patent cases where the 
government is not a party, the Court requests the views of the Solicitor 
General’s office before making a decision on whether to grant certiorari.110 
The views of the Solicitor General, especially at the certiorari stage, 
provide the Court with an additional barometer by which to measure 
“certworthiness,”111 but seeking those views may delay the process of 
Supreme Court review. 
 
 106. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct.  1923, 1938 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 107. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601–02 (2010) (“The Court’s precedents provide 
three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.’ While these exceptions are not required by the statutory text, they are 
consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’”) (citations omitted). 
 108. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1851). 
 109. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. 
 110. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 68, at 525–38; Stephenson, supra note 67, at 282, 285–86 
(“Between 1994 and 2007, the Supreme Court requested the views of the Solicitor General in seventeen 
Federal Circuit patent cases and did not follow the Solicitor General’s recommendation on whether to 
take the case only twice. Most significantly, patent cases accounted for over 10% of the Court’s [Calls 
for Views of the Solicitor General] orders between 2000 and 2008, a time where patent cases only took 
up 2.25% of the Supreme Court’s docket.”) (citations omitted). 
 111. Duffy, supra note 68, at 536 (“If the Supreme Court wanted some metric by which it could 
gauge whether the Federal Circuit as a whole had erred, it needed to find some novel way to evaluate 
certiorari petitions in patent cases. The [Calls for Views of the Solicitor General] mechanism appears to 
have filled that need. Since the 2000 Term, the Court has referred to the Solicitor General many more 
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 Other factors may delay Supreme Court resolution of the issues. For 
some issues that have already reached our court and been resolved, it takes 
time for them to reach the Supreme Court for review. For example, this was 
true in KSR where the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test originated 
with our predecessor court in the early 1960s112 yet only reached the 
Supreme Court in 2007. While comparatively much quicker, the delay in 
the Supreme Court’s review of the In re Seagate standard for enhanced 
damages this past term in Halo was also significant—nine years from 2007 
to 2016.113 Supreme Court delay in resolving issues can be beneficial in 
cases from the regional circuits where it allows the issue to percolate and 
be addressed by multiple courts, but that justification has less force where 
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction.114 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court does benefit in some cases by allowing our court to refine and clarify 
the scope of our decisions, and to enable the Court to better understand the 
consequences over a broad range of cases. 
CONCLUSION 
In looking to the future and what the next ten years have in store, I 
imagine my prediction will again hold that the Supreme Court will continue 
to take our cases and many of those will involve substantive patent law. 
Since I wrote that foreword a decade ago, patent law has only moved 
further into the mainstream. And the importance of intellectual property to 
the broader American economy has continued to grow, with an estimated 
84% of the S&P 500 Market Value attributable to intangible assets in 
2015.115 While we and the Supreme Court agree that patent law is 
important and while I continue to think that Supreme Court review of our 
 
certiorari petitions in patent cases than would be expected based on either (i) historical practice, or (ii) 
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cases is both essential and highly beneficial, my hope is that both our 
courts can foster greater mutual understanding and open further channels of 
communication. After all, as Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss has observed, 
both institutions “are caught in the Hruska Commission’s experiment” and 
we “must . . . figure out how a judiciary largely committed to generalist 
adjudication should deal with a court that is so differently constituted.”116 
 
 116. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—and 
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